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Saving the Neanderthals: Sin, Salvation, and Hard Evolution, by Mark 
S. McLeod-Harrison. Lexington/Fortress Academic, 2020. Pp. ix + 153.
$90.00 (hardcover).
JAMES T. TURNER, JR., Anderson University
In Saving the Neanderthals, Mark S. McLeod-Harrison attempts to defend 
a controversial thesis: Christian theology is consistent with “hard evo-
lution.” “Hard evolution” is a term of art by which McLeod-Harrison 
refers to a scientific thesis that he calls a “next-to-worst case scenario” 
for Christian theology (xi). This is because the only position assumed by 
many biological evolutionists (qua biological evolutionists) that it rejects 
is metaphysical naturalism, a metaphysics that entails that God doesn’t 
exist (xi). Hard evolution also assumes anti-essentialism, particularly with 
respect to biological species/kinds: strictly speaking, there are neither spe-
cies nor kinds, not in fact, anyway (xi). The various names of species one 
might deploy to discuss biological entities merely operate as devices to 
label the modally accidental arrangements of biological stuff.
Why is it controversial that Christian theology is consistent with hard 
evolution? McLeod-Harrison thinks that there are potential inconsisten-
cies between (1) how Christians often think about sin and salvation and 
(2) the deliverances of the biological sciences vis-à-vis biological evolution. 
than a lot of other introductions to the atonement. Third, the book is writ-
ten with an enjoyable and engaging mix of pure exposition of other views 
and opinionated engagement with those views. I believe this book would 
serve well as the main reading for a unit on the atonement in a lower-di-
vision undergraduate course, as well as for an upper-division undergrad-
uate course if paired with some more challenging primary sources on the 
atonement. It would also be the first book I would recommend to an intel-
ligent friend who wants to begin learning about the atonement.
It is worth noting that there are a couple of things absent from 
Approaching the Atonement that one might want in an introduction to the 
atonement. First, it does not focus on identifying and discussing the bibli-
cal support for each atonement doctrine. And second, it does not include 
much discussion of the work of philosophers of religion. Crisp’s book is 
focused instead on providing an introduction to theological work on the 
atonement, which it does superbly.
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The Christian topics of sin and salvation, relating as they do to “the Fall” 
and human atonement, seem to assume that humans are specially and 
specifically distinct from all other biological life, including, for example, 
their evolutionary cousins the Neanderthals. On hard evolution, though, 
humans are neither specially nor specifically distinct from Neanderthals 
(nor any other life form).
Now, I  think that McLeod-Harrison has taken on an extremely diffi-
cult task. At least one purpose of the monograph is apologetic: it seeks 
to defend orthodox Christianity as conceptually coherent and consistent 
with hard evolution. But, I think that McLeod-Harrison’s task actually is 
impossible, and so I think the book fails to defend its thesis. I’ll say more 
about why as I summarize quickly the chapters of the book.
Chapter one outlines the so-called “specialness” and “species” prob-
lems, namely that humans neither are a distinct species nor ontologi-
cally special. These are two propositions that, if true, may undermine 
Christianity’s claim that humans are responsible for sin entering the world 
and that God the Son’s incarnation as a human is soteriologically necessary.
Chapter two explains hard evolution more fully. McLeod-Harrison’s 
chief aim in this chapter, it seems to me, is to establish that hard evolu-
tion needn’t entail metaphysical naturalism, a thesis that presupposes that 
God does not exist. So, he defends hard evolution from potential counter-
arguments, particularly the ones he thinks might come from those who’ve 
argued against the compatibility of Christian theism with naturalism (e.g., 
Alvin Plantinga and Robert Koons). Doing so purportedly helps defend 
the claim that hard evolution, in the end, is compatible with the sort of 
“mere Christianity” one might think is committed only to, say, the first 
four ecumenical councils. For reasons I’ll mention anon, I think McLeod-
Harrison is wrong about this. But I do think that the arguments presented 
in chapter two provide reasons to think that hard evolution is consistent 
with the existence of God. But then again, a proposition P’s being consist-
ent with the proposition that God exists neither implies nor entails that P 
is consistent with Christian theism.
Chapters three and four provide arguments from current biological sci-
ence to the conclusion that there is nothing ontologically special about 
human beings, and in fact that there are no such things as humans. This is 
because, given anti-essentialism, there is no kind “human.” Instead, what 
there is, if there is anything, is a plurality of differentiated living biological 
organisms along a spectrum. “Human” is a label one gives to a particular 
range within a spectrum; but the label maps onto no thing (i.e., nothing) in 
particular. McLeod-Harrison presents a number of reasons for thinking 
that anti-essentialism is true in this regard, two of which are the supposed 
facts of “inter-species” mating (41–43) and problems associated with 
vagueness cases (e.g., there seem to be lifeforms that straddle the lines of 
various species, which would be impossible if the species were essentially 
distinct (76)). Of course, a worry for the problem of vagueness is that it 
presupposes essentialism. One can’t have vague cases of some species, S, if 
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there aren’t clearly delineated cases of S by which to compare the purport-
edly vague cases. On anti-essentialism, it’s incoherent to assert that it’s 
vague as to whether some organism, o, is of species S. Again, this is for the 
very obvious reason that on anti-essentialism, there is nothing it is to be an 
instance of species S (since there is no such species).
Relatedly, it’s not made clear why one should take epistemologically 
vague cases as an indicator of ontological vagueness. Worse still, if ontolog-
ical vagueness is inconsistent with essentialism as a metaphysical thesis, 
then assuming that there are ontologically vague biological particulars is 
to beg the question against the essentialist. Now, McLeod-Harrison is cor-
rect to flag up the tension between essentialism and the sort of “received” 
view of biological evolution. After all, it proceeds on anti-essentialist met-
aphysics. This points forward to a larger problem with the metaphysics 
presumed in the book, about which I will have more to say later. In any 
case, while chapters 3 and 4 seem to suggest that the essentialist is on the 
horns of a dilemma, this may be too quick a conclusion. There is litera-
ture advancing arguments for their compatibility (e.g., Travis Dumsday, 
“A New Argument for Intrinsic Biological Essentialism,” The Philosophical 
Quarterly 62 (2012): 486–504; David Oderberg, Real Essentialism (Routledge, 
2005), ch. 9).
Chapter five attempts to spell out more clearly why the denial of the 
specialness of humans and the denial of a human species is a genuine 
problem for Christian theism, particularly with respect to sin and atone-
ment. For if there’s no human species, then Anselm’s question “cur Deus 
homo?” becomes particularly vexing. As McLeod-Harrison points out, if 
hard evolution is true, then Anselm’s question is misstated (51). It should 
not be “why did God become human?” Rather, it should be: “What sort 
of human (broadly construed, that is including all Homo species) did God 
become and why” (51)?
In chapter six, McLeod-Harrison argues that sin and being sinful are 
neither specifically human nor essential to humanity. Of all the theses in 
this monograph, this seems to me the least tendentious. Most Christian 
theologians suppose that, in the eschaton, humans will be sinless. If so, 
then “being sinful” cannot be an essential property of humans. How they 
might remain sinless, and in fact impeccable, is a vexed question. But that 
they will so be is a point of general agreement. Now, what is troubling 
about this chapter is that, like the others, it deploys essentialist reasoning. 
McLeod-Harrison, on my reading, rightly suggests that it is not essential 
to human individuals qua human that they be sinful. The problem is that, 
given anti-essentialism, this is trivially true since nothing is essential to an 
individual qua human. Given anti-essentialism, there’s no such thing as a 
human essence.
In chapter seven, McLeod-Harrison attempts further to flesh out why 
“being a sinner” is not an essential property of human beings. Continuing 
in this vein, he suggests that the property “being a divine image bearer” 
is not a property of humans but of “biological persons.” But this chapter 
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begins immediately with a mistake that also pervades chapter six. Says 
McLeod-Harrison: “Being a sinner is not an essential property of humans, 
but is nevertheless virtually ubiquitous among us” (69). This seems to 
suggest that the “us” in question is not merely individuals qua individ-
uals; rather, it seems that he refers to humans. But, on hard evolution, 
there are no humans. And since anti-essentialism maintains that nothing 
is essential to humans, it’s utterly unsurprising that “being a sinner” is 
not an essential property of humans. For this reason, I find confusing his 
claim that humans essentially have the disjunctive property being “either 
possibly sinners or possibly saints and some cannot be sinners” (75). If 
anti-essentialism is true, there certainly aren’t any essential properties of 
biological organisms. (Of course, if anti-essentialism is true, there aren’t 
really any biological organisms either, since “biological organism” either 
picks out a kind or it doesn’t. On anti-essentialism, it doesn’t.)
In chapter eight, McLeod-Harrison further advances his thesis that 
the imago Dei rests on biological persons, where “biological person” 
is a catch-all term for any biological entity that has developed reason, 
self-awareness, and the capacity for communication (80). It is these kinds 
of creatures that are divine image bearers. Here he restates the anti-essen-
tialist position on which the book stands, saying, “there are no biologi-
cal natural kinds and hence no true species” (83). This allows, he thinks, 
for both Homo sapiens sapiens (modern humans) and Neanderthals to be 
image bearers since both can be biological persons. This is so, according 
to McLeod-Harrison’s argument, because image bearing consists partly in 
an individual’s uniqueness and individual history (84). But once more, the 
same objection arises: on anti-essentialism, there are no Homo sapiens sapiens 
and there are no Neanderthals. So, the imago Dei is not something that 
Homo sapiens sapiens and Neanderthals are. More than that, since there are 
no kinds of creatures, there are no kinds of creatures that are image bearers.
In addition to this problem, McLeod-Harrison also makes a basic theo-
logical and exegetical mistake concerning the notion of divine image bear-
ing. He claims mistakenly that to be an image of God is to be a “copy” (87) 
of the divine and that (as above) individuality is part and parcel of image 
bearing (84). But a cursory reading of contemporary biblical theological 
literature—particularly given the Ancient Near Eastern background of the 
Hebrew Bible and its understanding of divine image bearers—suggests 
that image bearers needn’t be, and often aren’t, anything like a copy of the 
god of whom they bear the image. Nor does image bearing have much (if 
anything) to do with individuality. Instead, divine image bearers are repre-
sentatives of a god’s rule and reign in a particular locale (see, for example, 
J. Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image (Brazos Press, 2005)). I think it 
would have strengthened the theological and biblical merit of his work if 
he had interacted in greater detail with this established position in biblical 
scholarship. But as it stands, he does not cite any historians of the Bible or 
of the Ancient Near East in this chapter.
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While I would never go so far as to say that philosophers shouldn’t be 
involved in the theological task, I think a philosopher should be more care-
ful when attending to biblical-theological topics. While McLeod-Harrison 
does not at all play fast and loose with the scientific data, I think his work 
would have been strengthened considerably if he had been similarly care-
ful with respect to historically rooted and exegetically defined concepts. 
The problem is that the task of the eighth chapter, namely a defense of 
the importance of thinking about biological persons as image bearers, 
becomes irrelevant. It assumes a certain understanding of what it means 
to bear the divine image that, as it turns out, is in fact foreign to biblical 
theology and thus to Christian theology.
Chapter nine is, to my mind, McLeod-Harrison’s strongest chapter. 
Here he advances a novel and interesting thesis: namely, that biological 
persons are capable of agape love and that this agape love—indeed gen-
uine love—is antithetical to altruism. According to McLeod-Harrison, 
this is because love of the genuine sort requires acting entirely out of 
“share-interest” (96), wherein a human is an “individual-in-communion” 
(96), and the fundamental nature of things is that they are shareable in 
a radical sense: no one gets her own as if one is an individually isolated 
self. Altruism, on McLeod-Harrison’s way of thinking, asks one to put 
another ahead of oneself. But this just is to act as if a self is not an indi-
vidual-in-communion. For what’s really at issue is seeking beauty, truth, 
and goodness, things in which all can participate equally (95–97). This, for 
McLeod-Harrison, is a deeper and richer account of love than altruistic 
notions. I think his thesis here invites further inquiry.
Chapter ten finishes his main project. Here he attempts to argue that 
God’s becoming a biological person is what’s important for atonement, 
not his becoming incarnate as a Homo sapiens sapiens. This is because “bio-
logical person” maps onto many hominid species, all of which are capable 
and guilty of sin. But once more, I think the same counterarguments can 
be made. Given anti-essentialism, there’s no species into which God the 
Son became incarnate. So, it’s false that God the Son became incarnate as 
a Homo sapiens sapiens because, on anti-essentialism, there’s no such thing 
as a Homo sapiens sapiens. At best, there are things that are arranged or 
behaving in Homo sapiens sapiens sorts of ways.
At this point, too, I would like to register my main theological com-
plaint. McLeod-Harrison suggests that hard evolution is consistent with 
orthodox Christianity, the sort of Christianity that can affirm the Nicene 
Creed and the Chalcedonian statement. Nevertheless, I  think that his 
arguments on this score are not successful. Here’s why: the Chalcedonian 
statement, at least, requires that God the Son became homoousios with 
humans. But where there is no essence (ousia), there is no homoousia. For 
this reason, on anti-essentialism, there is no truth to the claim that God 
the Son became homoousios with humankind. This is why I consider that 
anti-essentialism renders the Chalcedonian statement false, specifically its 
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claim that God the Son both is fully human and fully divine. It would not 
be false because Christ wouldn’t be divine, but because Christ wouldn’t 
be human. On anti-essentialism, there aren’t any humans. If anti-essen-
tialism were true, then Christ wouldn’t be human; thus the Chalcedonian 
statement would be false.
McLeod-Harrison might reply that the homoousia (or consubstantial-
ity) requirement of the Chalcedonian statement needn’t require biolog-
ical essentialism. Perhaps it requires only essentialism of another kind, 
namely that there are such things that are essentially biological persons. 
I  think there are two ways of responding to this possible counterargu-
ment. First, this capitulates to the problem, viz., it denies that Jesus is fully 
human. On anti-essentialism, there is nothing it is to be fully human (nei-
ther are there partial humans, since “human” doesn’t mark out a kind). 
From the point of view of orthodox Christianity, this would constitute a 
heresy. Second, it seems to affirm that there is at least one biological kind: 
biological person. Either these are biological entities or they aren’t. If they 
are, then they’re essentially biological entities and anti-essentialism about 
biological lifeforms is false. If they’re not, then strictly (and truthfully) 
speaking, they’re not biological (and the designation “biological person” 
becomes mysterious if it is meant to track with something that exists).
So, it is clear that I am not entirely on board with the project of this 
book. But, I  would like to make clear that my principal philosophical 
disagreement with the text is in the matter of metaphysics. McLeod-
Harrison suggests that he wants to take hard evolution seriously because 
he thinks that proper biology should be free of metaphysical assumptions 
(10). But from my point of view, this would be a philosophical mistake. 
Metaphysics is first philosophy and so more fundamental than biology. 
Biology comes only after we’ve first done our best to carve reality at its 
joints (recognizing that, like biological science, this work never ceases). 
One reason for thinking this is suggested by the evident difficulty of dis-
cussing biology without presupposing real distinctions between species, a 
distinction which in turn presupposes that there are such things as real spe-
cies. McLeod-Harrison suggests that essentialism doesn’t help the biolo-
gist as biologist (76). I admit that I find this difficult to understand. I would 
say that biology presupposes it, since it marks things out as living and 
not-living. But this could only be the case if there’s something essentially 
distinct between living things and non-living ones. And if there is, then 
biological essentialism is a presupposition of biology. For these reasons, 
then, I do not find that Saving the Neanderthals puts forth a perfectly satis-
factory case for hard evolution and its consistency with Christian doctrine. 
Nevertheless, I am fascinated by McLeod-Harrison’s proposal regarding 
the distinction between agape and altruism, which I think merits further 
investigation.
